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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-PROCEDURAL
DUEPROCESS-STUDENT
HAS
RIGHTTO HAVEATTORNEY
PRESENTAT UNIVERSITY
DISCIPLINARY
U.i t ~
HEARING
WHENCRIMINAL
CHARGES
AREP E ~ ~ 1 ~ G - G a b r i ~ o w
Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978).
In November 1977, Steven A. Gabrilowitz, a senior a t the
University of Rhode Island, was charged with assault with intent
to commit rape on another student. A few days later, he received
a letter from the university directing him to appear before the
University Board on Student Conduct to defend against the same
allegation. *
The rules governing a student's rights at university disciplinary hearings prohibited the assistance or presence of legal counsel a t the hearing.2Claiming he had a constitutional right to legal
counsel, Gabrilowitz petitioned the federal district court for an
injunction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. $ 1983.3 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction against officials of the university, restraining them from conducting the disciplinary hearing
1. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100, 101 (1st Cir. 1978). Gabrilowitz was also
directed to defend against a second allegation involving a later assault on the same
student. Id.
2. Id. a t 101-02. A student at the University of Rhode Island was not "permitted to
employ professional legal counsel or other persons from outside the University Community
to present the case before the hearing board," although he had "the right to request the
assistance of an advisor of hislher choice from the community." Id. a t 102 (quoting
§ 23.6 (student's guide to the university)).
RAMPAGES
3. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action a t law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
Since claims under this Civil Rights Act must be founded upon deprivations resulting
from state action, private institutions have been distinguished from tax-supported institutions. E.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia
Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For a discussion of the concept of "state action"
L.
and the private college, see O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO
REV. 155 (1970); Wilkinson & Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56
A.B.A.J. 121 (1970); Note, Legal Relationship Between the Student and the Private College or University, 7 SANDIEGOL. REV.244 (1970); Comment, Student Due Process in the
Private University: The State Action Doctrine, 20 SYRACUSE
L. REV.911 (1969); Comment,
Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5 WILL AM^
L.J. 277 (1969); 44 TUL.L. REV. 184 (1969).
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against Gabrilowitz unless he was allowed representation by an
attorney of his ~ h o i c e . ~
In Gabrilowitz v. N e ~ r n a nthe
, ~ United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, with Judge Campbell dissenting, modified and then affirmed the order of the district court. The court
concluded that because of the pending criminal charges, the appellee, Gabrilowitz, had a due process right to have his lawyer
present at the disciplinary hearing for consultation and advice."

Implicit in the issue of whether appellee in the instant case
has the right to have his attorney present at the college disciplinary hearing is the broader question of whether an accused in a
criminal proceeding has the right to have his attorney present a t
a parallel civil proceeding. Resolution of both questions requires
application of procedural due process theory.

A. Procedural Due Process
The procedural due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment provide protection for individuals faced with governmental actions that may deprive them of private interests.' Under
most circumstances, the minimum procedural safeguards required by the fourteenth amendment are adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard? Additional safeguards may be required,
depending upon the circumstances of each case.'
Traditionally, the due process requirements of a particular
case are determined by applying a procedural due process balancing test.1° In applying the test, a court balances the interests of
the individual affected by the governmental action in question
4. Gabrilowitz v. Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15,1977) (order granting preliminary injunction), aff'd as modified, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir., 1978).
5. 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1978).
6. Id. a t 107.
7. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part: "No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.amend. XIV,
6 1.
8. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 US.
371 (1971); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944); Baker v. Baker, Eccles
& Co., 242 U S . 394 (1917).
9. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
10. E.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948, 953 n.3 (1978); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equity and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,848-49 (1977); Dixon
v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-15 (1977); Ingrahan v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
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against the government's interest in avoiding the burdens that a
particular safeguard would impose.ll Slight factual variations
become extremely important in this balancing process and much
discretion is left with the court to fix values on the respective
interests involved. Because the concept of procedural due process
is so elusive,12 the few courts that have confronted the issue of
whether a student has a due process right to counsel at a disciplinary hearing have reached divergent conclusions.

B. Right to Counsel at Student Disciplinary Proceedings
Dixon u. Alabama State Board of Education13 is recognized
authority for the position that, a t a minimum, due process requires that a student be given notice and an opportunity for a
hearing before being expelled from a tax-supported college for
misconduct.14In Dixon, the court indicated that before a student
can be expelled he must be informed of the specific charges
against him and the grounds which justify his expulsion, be given
the names of accusing witnesses and the facts to which each
witness testifies, and have an opportunity at the hearing to present his own defense.15
The right to counsel was not mentioned in Dixon as a requi11. The due process balancing test is described by the Supreme Court in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976):
More precisely, our prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
12. As Chief Justice Warren stated in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960),
"'Due Process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content
varies according to specific factual contexts."
13. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.) (black college students expelled without adequate notice
or hearing for alleged disruptions and demonstrations), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
14. 294 F.2d at 158. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 n.8 (1975); Vargas v.
Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1974); Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377, 385 (2d
Cir. 1973).
15. 294 F.2d at 158-59. However, the court also pointed out
[tlhis is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to crossexamine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and
disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college's educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of
an adversary proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college.
Id. a t 159.
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site of due process. Several courts have relied on this omission as
support for the view that the right to counsel is not one of the
required safeguards at a disciplinary hearing? In addition, courts
have refused to recognize a student's right to the assistance of
counsel for a variety of other reasons. They have pointed out, for
example, that the hearing is nonadjudicative in nature" and
should be kept informal.lRSome courts have reasoned that a literate and educated student should be able to adequately defend
himself without the presence of legal counsel.lgOther courts have
emphasized that undesirable consequences would result from the
interference courts would impose upon a college's right to formulate its own disciplinary procedure^.^^
In contrast to the above reasoning, some courts have recognized a right to counsel a t student disciplinary hearing^.^' These
courts have generally concluded that the risk of expulsion is a
sufficiently serious deprivation to mandate this procedural safeguard? They have stressed the benefits of legal counsel in pro16. E.g.,Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967) (junior high
school student had no right to be represented by counsel a t guidance conference concerning his suspension), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d
807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967) (merchant marine cadet dismissed from academy had right t o
evidentiary hearing, but no right to counsel); Haynes v. Dallas County Junior College
Dist., 386 F. Supp. 208,212 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (college student denied counsel a t suspension
hearing); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236 (S.D.W. Va.) (college students suspended for disorderly conduct were not entitled to counsel a t hearing), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638
(4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969); Due v. Florida A & M Univ., 233 F.
Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (students convicted of contempt did not have right t o
counsel a t subsequent college disciplinary hearing).
17. E.g.,Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778, 788 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1028 (1968); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v.
Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 238 (S.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969).
18. E.g.,Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 211 (2d Cir. 1972).
19. E.g., id. a t 211-12; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967);
Garshman v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912, 921 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
20. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Garshman v.
Pennsylvania State Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912, 921 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
21. E.g,Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1973) (high school students entitled to representation of counsel when facing suspension
or expulsion); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 467 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (high school
students entitled to counsel a t expulsion hearing); Marin v. University of P.R., 377 F.
Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974) (university students entitled to assistance of retained counsel); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202,209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (children may not be excluded
from elementary school without a hearing a t which retained counsel may participate);
French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D. La. 1969) (university student entitled
to retained, but not appointed counsel a t expulsion hearing); Esteban v. Central Mo.
State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (university student has right t o
presence of counsel a t disciplinary hearing, although he has no right to full representation).
22. The court in the instant case, however, felt the risk of expulsion alone was insuffi-
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tecting a student's interests at the hearing,23the fact that commentators favor the recognition of a right to counsel in disciplinary proceeding^,'^ and the finding that intrusions upon the
school or college would be minimaleZ5
The Supreme Court has not decided whether the presence of
legal counsel is required for a student facing expulsion at a disciplinary hearing. However, in Goss u. Lopez,26the Court did address the question of whether the right to counsel is a required
procedural safeguard at a high school disciplinary proceeding involving short suspensions.
In Goss, high school students in the Columbus, Ohio, public
school system brought a class action seeking review of their temporary suspensions from high school. A three-judge federal district court held that the students had been denied due process of
law because they had been suspended from their high schools
without a hearing.27The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of the district court and, on the issue of the students' right to
counsel, stated:
We stop short of construing the Due Process Clause to require,
countrywide, that hearings in connection with short suspensions
cient to mandate the presence of counsel at a disciplinary hearing. See notes 66, 92 and
accompanying text infra.
23. E.g., French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1377 (E.D. La. 1969).
24. E.g., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1973); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969).
Not surprisingly, the majority of cases involving student disciplinary proceedings
arose during the 1960's in a period of student activism and campus disorder. Numerous
law review articles and comments written during this period discuss a student's right to
counsel at college disciplinary hearings. E.g., Frey, The Right of Counsel in Student
Disciplinary Hearings, 5 VAL.L. REV. 48 (1970); Heyman, Some Thoughts on University
Disciplinary Proceedings, 54 CALIF.L. REV.73, 79-80 (1966); Johnson, The Constitutional
Rights of College Students, 42 T E XL.
. REV.344,352 (1964); Kutner, Habeas Scholastics:
An Ombudsman for Academic Due Process-A Proposal, 23 U . MIAMIL. REV.107, 147
(1968); Sherry, Governance of the University: Rules, Rights, and Responsibilities, 54
CALIF.L. REV. 23, 37 (1966); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DEN.
L.J. 582, 593 (1968); Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND.L. REV. 1027,
1075-76 (1969); Project-Procedural Due Process and Campus Disorder: A Comparison of
Law and Practice, 1970 DUKEL.J. 763, 783-85; Note, Reasonable Rules, Reasonably Enforced-Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceedings, 53 MINN.L. REV.301, 323
(1968); Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and University Disciplinary Procedures,
34 Mo. L. REV.236, 249-51 (1969); Note, Student Discipline Cases at State Universities
in New 1Mexico-Procedural Due Process, N.M.L. REV.231,236-39 (1971); Comment, The
College Student and Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings, 13 S.D.L. REV. 87, 106-09
(1968);Comment, School Expulsions and Due Process, 14 U . KAN.L. REV.108,113 (1965).
25. E.g., Marin v. University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974).
26. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
27. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). However, the district court concluded that the schools were
not required to permit the presence of counsel. 372 F. Supp. a t 1302.
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must afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to
confront and cross-examine witnesses supporting the charge, or
to call his own witnesses to verify his version of the incident.2u

Although the Court intimated that counsel might be required
,~~
in cases involving expulsion or longer periods of s u s p e n s i ~ nit
did not reach that issue. Therefore, lower courts have admitted
that there is a lack of established precedent involving the right
to counsel where a student faces the risk of expulsion a t a college
disciplinary hearing."

C. Right to Counsel at Civil Proceedings Parallel to Criminal
Actions
The First Circuit in Gabrilowitz was faced with a legal question that surprisingly has not been resolved: Does an individual
have a due process right to counsel at a civil proceeding where his
testimony may be used against him in a pending criminal trial?31
28. 419 U.S. a t 583.
29. Id. a t 584: "In more difficult cases, [the disciplinarian] may permit counsel. . . . Longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures."
Recently, the Supreme Court has commented that more stringent procedural due
process safeguards are required for college expulsions involving misconduct than for dismissals based upon the failure to meet academic standards. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948,955 (1978). However, the Court did not state that these more stringent
requirements include the right to counsel.
30. E.g., Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 582 F.2d at 105; Garshman v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 395 F. Supp. 912,920 (M.D. Pa. 1975); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337
(E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1970).
31. Appellee was arraigned before a district judge four days prior to the time he
received notice to appear at the disciplinary hearing. Brief for Appellee at 4, Gabrilowitz
v. Newman, 582 F.2d 100 (1st Cir., 1978). Although an arraignment may be a "critical
stage" which confers a sixth amendment right to counsel, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S.
52 (1961), a college disciplinary hearing is obviously not part of the criminal proceeding.
The sixth amendment right to counsel applies only to personal confrontations between the
accused and the state in the prosecution of a criminal case. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 309-12 (1973); United States v. Wilcox, 507 F.2d 364,369 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 979 (1975).
The court in the instant case was faced with the question of whether an accused has
a due process right to counsel a t a parallel civil proceeding where his sixth amendment
right to counsel does not attach. The district court believed this issue was one of first
impression: "The court is unaware, and counsel have called no authority to its attention
which holds that in the dilemma created by the parallel course of proceedings involved in
this action, it has been held that due process does or does not require the right to counsel."
Gabrilowitz v. Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15, 1977) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
The First Circuit pointed out that two cases, Nzuve v. Castleton State College, 133
Vt. 225, 335 A.2d 321 (1975), and Furutani v. Ewigleban, 297 F. Supp. 1163 (N.D. Cal.
1969), did "involve the specter of a pending criminal case hovering over the hearing." 582
F.2d at 104. However, these cases did not deal with the right to counsel issue. In Nzuve
the university disciplinary rules provided for the right to counsel at the hearing. 133 Vt.
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Supreme Court decisions most directly applicable to this issue
have involved civil proceedings such as fire marshal investigat i o n ~ grand
, ~ ~ jury hearings,33and prison disciplinary hearings34
where a suspect, witness, or prisoner is denied the presence of his
attorney despite the fact that his testimony may later be introduced against him should he be criminally charged.35
In In re G r o b ~ nthe
, ~ ~Supreme Court refused to recognize a
right to counsel for witnesses at a state fire marshal's investigation even though the witnesses were under suspicion of causing
the fire under investigation. Emphasizing that this was not a
proceeding that would adjudicate the witnesses' responsibility for
the fire, the Court stated:
The fact that appellants['] . . . testimony might provide
a basis for criminal charges against them does not mean that
they had a constitutional right to the assistance of their counsel. . . . Obviously in these situations evidence obtained may
possibly lay a witness open to criminal charges. When such
charges are made in a criminal proceeding, he then may demand
the presence of his counsel for his defense. Until then his protection is the privilege against self-in~rirnination.~'

Justice Black, writing for the dissent, argued that the due
process clause requires the presence of counsel when a suspect is
compelled to give testimony that may be used against him in a
subsequent criminal action." Despite the persuasiveness of Jusa t 229, 335 A.2d a t 324. In Furutani an action was brought to enjoin college officials from
conducting expulsion hearings until after the completion of the criminal trials arising out
of the same misconduct for which the students had been suspended; no attack was made
by the students on the disciplinary hearing itself.
In Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968), the court took notice of the absence of pending criminal charges to justify its
conclusion that due process did not mandate the presence of counsel in disciplinary
hearings. ''[Vhere is no showing that any attempt is ever made to use any statement a t
the conference in any subsequent criminal proceeding. . . . Therefore, there is no need
for counsel to protect the child in his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination." 386 F.2d a t 780.
32. E.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
33. E.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
34. E.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974).
35. Legal distinctions between a suspect and an accused are discussed in notes 7778, 89 infra.
36. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
37. Id. a t 332-33 (footnote omitted).
38. Id. a t 344-46 (Black, J., dissenting):.
It may be that the type of interrogation which the Fire Marshall and his deputies
are authorized to conduct would not technically fit into the traditional category
of formal criminal proceedings, but the substantive effect of such interrogation
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tice Black's dissenting opinion, Groban set the precedent for refusing to recognize a due process right to counsel in most investigative proceeding^.^'
In United States v. Mandujano,'O a witness had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating narcotics traffic.
The witness was not given Miranda warnings and he was not
allowed to have his attorney present in the grand jury room.
Along with holding that a witness before a grand jury is not entitled to Miranda warnings, the Supreme Court stated:
Respondent was also informed that if he desired he could
have the assistance of counsel, but that counsel could not be
inside the grand jury room. That statement was plainly a correct
recital of the law. No criminal proceedings had been instituted
against respondent, hence the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not come into play. . . . Under settled principles the
witness may not insist upon the presence of his attorney in the
grand jury

Justice Brennan disagreed with the conclusion that it is a
"settled" principle that the right to counsel does not exist for
grand jury witnesses.42He argued that the guidance of counsel is
on an eventual criminal prosecution of the person questioned can be so great
that he should not be compelled to give testimony when he is deprived of the
advice of his counsel.

....

It is said that a witness can protect himself against some of the many abuses
possible in a secret interrogation by asserting the privilege against selfincrimination. But this proposition collapses under any more than the most
superficial consideration. The average witness has little if any idea when or how
to raise any of his constitutional privileges. . . . [an view of the intricate
possibilities of waiver which surround the privilege he may easily unwittingly
waive it.
39. See, e.g., Anonymous Nos. 6 & 7 v. Baker, 360 US. 287, 295 (1959), where the
Court, basing its decision in part on Groban, held that there was no due process right to
counsel in a purely investigative proceeding.
40. 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
41. Id. .at 581. As authority, the Court cited In re Groban, 352 U S . 330 (1957), and
Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Groban, the Court had stated:
"A witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on being
represented by his counsel . . . . " 352 US. at 333 (footnote omitted).
Rule 6(d) specifies who may be present in the grand jury room during federal investigations:
Attorneys for the government, the witness under examination, interpreters when
needed and, for the purpose of taking the evidence, a stenographer or operator
of a recording device may be present while the grand jury is in session, but no
person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating
or voting.
FED.R. CRIM.P. 6(d).
42. 425 US.at 603 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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generally necessary to enable a grand jury witness to effectively
avoid prejudice to his fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination .43
Wolff v. M ~ D o n n e l l decided
,~~
in 1974, was the first major
Supreme Court opinion to discuss. the ramifications of recognizing a right to counsel at prison disciplinary hearings. The Court
reasoned that the presence of a prisoner's attorney would give the
hearing a more "adversary cast," delay the proceedings, and reduce the effectiveness of such hearings "as a means to further
correctional goals." The Court concluded: "At this stage of the
development of these procedures we are not prepared to hold that
inmates have a right to either retained or appointed counsel in
disciplinary proceedings."45
Two years after Wolff, the Supreme Court again considered
the question of whether the presence of counsel is necessary to
protect a prisoner's rights at a disciplinary hearing. In Barter u.
Palmigiano, 46 the prisoner, Palmigiano, was informed that criminal charges might be filed against him for inciting a disturbance
at the prison. He was also required to appear before the prison
disciplinary board to face possible disciplinary action for his alleged misconduct. He was not allowed to have his attorney present at this hearing. Palmigiano chose to remain silent and the
disciplinary board punished him for his involvement in the disturbance.
The First Circuit held that Palmigiano was entitled to the
It is true that dictum in In re Groban, 352 US.330,333 (1957), denied that
there is any constitutional right of a witness to be represented by counsel when
testifying before a grand jury. But neither Groban nor any other case in this
Court has squarely presented the question.
Id. (footnote omitted).
43. Id. a t 604 (quoting M a n e s v. Meyers, 419 US. 449, 466 (1975)):
"The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other rights, often
depends upon legal advice from someone who is trained and skilled in the
subject matter, and who may offer a more objective opinion. A layman may not
be aware of the precise scope, the nuances, and boundaries of his Fifth Amendment privilege. It is not a self-executing mechanism; it can be affirmatively
waived, or lost by not asserting it in a timely fashion."
Consistent with Justice Brennan's criticism, some commentators have argued that
counsel should be present a t investigations before a grand jury. E.g., Boudin, The Federal
Grand Jury, 61 GEO.L.J. 1 (1972); Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?,
10 AM. CRIM.L. REV.807 (1972); Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41
F.R.D.189 (1967); Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE
L.J. 97.
44. 418 US. 539 (1974).
45. Id. a t 570.
46. 425 US. 308 (1976).
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presence of counsel at the disciplinary hearing since statements
made at the hearing could be used in a later criminal prosecution
. ~ ~ Supreme Court did not agree,
for the same m i s c ~ n d u c t The
noting that "[nlo criminal proceedings are or were pending
against Palmigiano. The State has not . . . sought to make evidentiary use of his silence at the disciplinary hearing in any criminal pro~eeding."~~
Stressing the "peculiar environment of the
prison setting,"" the Court held that a prisoner has no right to
the presence of counsel at a prison disciplinary hearing.50
Consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in these cases,
lower courts have generally concluded that the presence of counsel is not mandatory in civil proceedings, despite the fact that
information elicited might provide the basis for subsequent criminal charges. Thus, courts have held that suspects facing possible
criminal charges have no due process right to the presence of their
attorneys at coroner's inquests,51motor vehicle license revocation
hearings,52doctor disciplinary proceeding^,^^ or police disciplinary
proceedings .54
47. Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1290-92 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on rehearing, 510 F.2d 534
(1st Cir.), rev'd, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The First Circuit did not intend to limit the right to
counsel to situations where criminal charges were pending. To the contrary, the court
would have extended the right to counsel to prisoners not yet charged because their
misconduct is punishable as a crime and their testimony might be used in a later prosecution for the same misconduct.
48. 425 U.S. 308, 317 (1976).
49. Id. at 322 n.5.
50. Id. at 315. The interpretation of Baxter is a subject of controversy in the instant
case. See note 78 infra.
51. E.g., United States v. Pate, 427 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
914 (1971). But cf. State v. Halvorsen, 79 S.D. 209, 110 N.W.2d 132 (1961) (the absence
of counsel for one subpoenaed and suspected of homicide may be pertinent in determining
whether he has been denied his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination).
52. E.g., Ferguson v. Gathright, 485 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
933 (1974). But cf. the dissent in this case:
Ferguson was convicted of driving after his license had been revoked, and
he was sentenced to three years in prison. Although he was represented at that
trial, his counsel could not question the issues determined at his uncounseled
revocation hearing. Therefore, I would hold that-absent a valid waiver-a
person cannot be constitutionally imprisoned where an essential element of his
crime was conclusively adjudicated in a license revocation proceeding where he
was prejudiced by the lack of counsel.
Id. at 509 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
53. E.g., Suess v. Pugh, 245 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.W. Va. 1965).
54. E.g., Grabinger v. Conlisk, 320 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ill. 1970), aff'd, 455 F.2d 490
(7th Cir. 1972).
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II. INSTANT
CASE
In considering the instant case, the First Circuit acknowledged that most courts have declined to recognize a right to counsel in college disciplinary hearings.s5Nevertheless, after applying
the procedural due process balancing tests6it upheld the district
court's injunction, ruling that appellee had the right to the presence of counsel at the disciplinary hearing." However, the court
did not reach or decide the issue of whether he had the right to
full representation, with counsel conducting direct and crosse~amination.~~
The court viewed the pending criminal charges against appellee as the factor which tipped the balance in his favor." It
found appellee would be unconstitutionally deprived of due process if, without the presence of counsel and in the face of the
pending criminal action, he was forced to choose between the risk
of expulsion and the risk of self-incrimination at the hearinge60
The presence of counsel would not remove all risks, the court
conceded, but would enable appellee to make an intelligent
choice between the risks he would face in testifying at the hearing!
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Campbell argued that the
existence of pending criminal charges is irrelevant to the question
of the right to counsel at a disciplinary hearing.62He warned that
the holding of the court "opens the door to a claim of right to
counsel in almost all student disciplinary proceeding^."^^ He re55. 582 F2d at 104. Likewise, the district court had stated: "The court is aware that
the weight of authority generally supports the position of the defendants." Gabrilowitz v.
Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction). In
truth, however, there seems to be no "weight of authority" on either side. See notes 1625, 30 and accompanying text supra.
56. 582 F.2d at 105. The court quoted the test as outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See note 11supra.
57. 582 F.2d a t 107.
58. Id. at 101. The injunction issued by the district court was interpreted by the First
Circuit to mean that appellee's attorney would be entitled to represent appellee by conducting direct and cross-examination. However, counsel for appellee stated at oral argument that all appellee wanted was the presence of his lawyer during the hearing for
consultation and advice. Consequently, the First Circuit limited itself to the question of
whether appellee was entitled to the presence of an attorney at the hearing, without active
participation by the attorney.
59. Id. a t 107.
60. Id. at 104, 107.
61. Id. a t 106.
62. Id. a t 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
315 (1976)). See note 78 infra.
63. 582 F.2d at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
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jected the court's finding that it was necessary to extend to appellee the right to the presence of counsel a t the hearing, since appellee could receive most of the benefits of his attorney's presence
by consulting with him both before the proceeding began and
outside the hearing room while the proceeding was in progress."

A. Examination of the Court's Reasoning
1. Application of due process balancing test

In applying the due process balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge," the court adequately pinpointed appellee's private interests. They were three-fold: (1)to avoid making
incriminating statements at the hearing that could be used
against him at his criminal trial, (2) to fully participate in the
hearing to protect himself from expulsion, and (3) to make an
intelligent choice between the risk of self-incrimination and the
risk of expulsion at the hearing? The court also correctly assessed
64. Id.
65. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See note 11 supra.
66. 582 F.2d at 105-06. There was no attempt by the court to classify appellee's
interest in remaining in college as a liberty or a property interest; nor was a determination
made as to whether his attendance at college was a right or a privilege.
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975), the Supreme Court concluded that
students facing temporary suspension from a public school have property and liberty
interests that qualify for protection under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Appellants in the instant case sought to distinguish Goss by arguing that, although
students have a right to attend lower public schools, the state confers only a privilege to
attend college. Brief for Appellants at 26. However, this "right versus privilege" argument
has been rejected by the Supreme Court. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
571 (1972) ("[Tjhe Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between
'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the application of procedural due
process rights.") (footnote omitted); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)
("[Tlhis Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether
a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.' "); Cafeteria &
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886,894 (1961) (" 'One may not have
a constitutional right to go to Baghdad, but the Government may not prohibit one from
going there unless by means consonant with due process of law.' ") (quoting Homer v.
Richmond, 292 F.2d 719, 722 (1961)). See also Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294
F.2d at 156 ("['Tlhe State cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the
renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process.").
Appellee's interest in protecting himself from the risk of expulsion, whether viewed
as involving a property interest, liberty interest, right, or privilege, was not recognized by
either the district court or the First Circuit as a sufficient justification for requiring a right
to counsel at the hearing. See note 92 infra. Yet, courts and commentators who have
advocated a right to counsel at disciplinary hearings have concluded that the risk of
expulsion alone mandates the presence of counsel. See note 22 and accompanying text
supra. The student's potential loss of the opportunity to complete his education is viewed
by some as far outweighing any intrusions upon the college that would result from recog-
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the predominant interest of the university: "Academic institutions have a significant interest in the promulgation of procedures
for the resolution of student disciplinary problem^."^^
After identifying and weighing the conflicting interests of the
student and the university, the court must, under procedural due
process analysis, consider (1) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of . . . [the private interests] through the procedures used"
and (2) "the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguard^."^ In the instant case, the first consideration required an evaluation of appellee's risk of erroneously forfeiting his privilege against self-incrimination a t the disciplinary
hearing. The second consideration required a determination of
the probable value of the presence of appellee's attorney in the
hearing room.
The First Circuit concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation of appellee's privilege against self-incrimination was substantial? However, this risk may not have been as great as the
court feared in light of the university's peer review system,70a
facet of the university's procedures not discussed by the court. If
the disciplinary board had been comprised solely of faculty members, or if the hearing were to have been conducted by counsel for
the university, there would have been a more substantial need for
the presence of counsel to ensure that appellee's interests were
adequately protected." However, in the instant case, the disciplinary board was comprised primarily of students who probably
had no greater skill than appellee in dealing with disciplinary
proceedings. In addition, the fact that appellee had a right to the
assistance of an advisor of his choice from within the university
community decreased the danger that he would be coerced or
tricked into incriminating himself at the hearing.72
nizing a student's right to counsel. As stated in Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 HAW. L. REV. 1045, 1141 (1968) (footnote omitted), "[Wlhat seems to the
administrator a minor problem may be to the student the disaster of his life."
67. 582 F.2d at 106. See also Healey v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972); Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); Morales v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988, 997
(D.N.H. 1976); Furutani v. Ewigleban, 297 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
The court in the instant case felt that the university's interest in formulating disciplinary procedures would be only minimally affected, since the presence of counsel would
serve only to protect appellee's rights at the future criminal trial and not to influence the
results of the disciplinary hearing. 582'F.2d a t 106.
68. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
69. 582 F.2d at 106.
70. The disciplinary board a t the University of Rhode Island was composed of six
students and one member of the faculty. Brief for Appellants at 8.
71. See, e.g. Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French v.
Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969).
72. See note 2 supra.
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The value of the presence of appellee's attorney a t the hearing was likewise called into question by Judge Campbell in his
dissenting opinion. Although the majority intimated that the
critical choices faced by appellee could be made only at the hearing,73Judge Campbell argued persuasively that appellee's determination of whether or not to testify a t the hearing, including the
threshold evaluation of the effect his statements might have on
the subsequent criminal case, could be made before the hearing
began. He also mentioned the availability of periodic consultations with counsel outside the hearing room during the disciplinary proceeding^.^' Thus, the value of the additional procedural
safeguard of counsel in the hearing room may be less than what
the court indicated in its opinion.75
2. Pertinent case law not addressed by the court

The court did not discuss in its opinion one line of relevant
Supreme Court decisions which, although not strictly precedential, are at least important to the resolution of the issues presented in the instant case. These are the cases holding that witnesses a t investigative proceedings have no right to the presence
of counsel even though they may be under suspicion and face
possible criminal ~harges.~Wowever,
these cases do not necessarily run contrary to the court's decision. In fact, the court could
have noted the strong dissents and the important distinguishing
features in these cases in order to provide support for its holding
in the instant case." Unfortunately, these Supreme Court deci73. 582 F.2d at 105.
The private interest and risk of erroneous deprivation that will be affected
by the refusal of the hearing board to allow appellee the assistance of counsel
depend upon the choice made at the hearing. If appellee chooses not to risk selfincrimination, he risks loss of his college degree. If he chooses to protect his
degree, he risks self-incrimination and possible imprisonment of up to twenty
years. All that appellee asks is that he be allowed the advice of counsel when
he throws his college degree into the balance against a possible loss of liberty.
Id. (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 107-08 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
75. One reason mentioned by the court for allowing the presence of counsel at the
disciplinary hearing was to provide the opportunity for counsel to "observe the proceeding
first-hand so as to be better prepared to deal with attempts to introduce evidence from
the hearing at a later criminal proceeding." 582 F.2d at 106 (footnote omitted). However,
the court cited no authority for the proposition that an accused's attorney must be permitted to observe a private civil hearing for the purpose of plotting strategy for an upcoming
criminal trial. Neither grand jury investigations nor other investigative proceedings permit such a luxury; nor is the prosecuting attorney invited to disciplinary hearings to help
him in the preparation of his case.
76. See notes 32-43 and accompanying text supra.
77. For example, In re Groban, 352 U.S.330 (1957), seems to stand for the proposition
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sions were not confronted by the court and their possible conflict
with the instant case was left u n r e s ~ l v e d . ~ ~

B. Alternative Means of Protecting a Student's Rights
In order to evaluate the soundness of the court's decision in
the instant case it is necessary to discuss alternative resolutions
to the self-incrimination dilemma presented by parallel civil and
criminal proceedings. There are several such alternative resolutions possible. For example, a federal court has authority to stay
a civil proceeding when it may prejudice an accused's rights at a
pending criminal trialeTg
But while this might be a reasonable
that the fourteenth amendment does not guarantee the right to counsel when the worst
that can result from a state proceeding is the elicitation of information that might be used
against the witness in some subsequent criminal trial. However, at the time of Groban,
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination had not been incorporated into
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. State, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). The privilege against selfincrimination was not protected from state action until after Groban. See, e.g., Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Also, the court in the instant case could have noted court decisions holding that where
a grand jury investigation is directed against a particular person in such a way that the
person stands in the status of an accused, unless he is accorded the same rights as a
defendant in a criminal action, his privilege against self-incrimination protects him from
taking the witness stand. E.g., United States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1967);
People v. Laino, 10 N.Y.2d 161, 176 N.E.2d 571, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1961), appeal
dismissed, 374 U.S. 104 (1963); Commonwealth v. Gross, 172 Pa. Super. Ct. 85, 92 A.2d
251 (1952). Contra, United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U S .
897 (1955) ("suspect-accused" dichotomy criticized).
78. The court did discuss and attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court cases involving prison disciplinary hearings. Although the dissent felt that Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), necessarily make the factor
of pending criminal charges irrelevant to the issue of the right to counsel in a parallel civil
proceeding, 582 F.2d at 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting), the majority felt that prison hearings can be distinguished from college disciplinary proceedings. The court pointed to "the
exceptional nature of the prison context" and "[rlepeated references [in the prison
cases] to the exigencies attending prison settings and the concomitant inappropriateness
of applying inflexible due process standards . . . . "Id. at 105 n.4 (majority opinion). See
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 322 n.5; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U S a t 560.
In addition, the court noted "the absence of pending criminal charges in those cases."
582 F.2d at 105 n.4. In Baxter, the Supreme Court had intimated that the absence of
pending criminal charges was a controlling factor in its determination that the prisoner
was not entitled to counsel at his prison disciplinary hearing. 425 U S . at 317.
The court cited Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1(1968), as a prison case illustrating that because of the pendency of criminal charges, even within the prison setting there
are instances where the right to counsel is essential to ensure due process. 582 F.2d a t 105
n.4. However, it was not the pendency of criminal charges alone that formed the basis for
the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis, but the fact that the prisoner was in custody and
had been interrogated by a state official, so that this Miranda rights had attached. 391
U.S. a t 4-5.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 11-27 (1970); Arthurs v. Stern,
560 F.2d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 768 (1978). For a discussion of
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solution in some cases, it would not have been an adequate remedy in the instant case. Appellee was a senior a t the university
and would have graduated by the time the criminal trial was
~ o m p l e t e dTo
. ~ ~stay the proceedings under these circumstances
would have been a greater intrusion upon the university than to
allow appellee to have his attorney present a t the hearing. The
university would have lost its opportunity to enforce its disciplinary rules.
Instead of staying the civil hearing, the court conceivably
could have fashioned an "exclusionary rule," holding that when
a college disciplinary hearing precedes the disposition of criminal
charges arising out of the same alleged misconduct, the testimony
of the student a t the disciplinary hearing is inadmissible against
him during the subsequent criminal trial?' However, the detrimental impact of refusing to allow the introduction of probative
evidence a t the subsequent criminal trial should be weighed
against the negative effects of permitting counsel to be present a t
the parallel civil proceeding. In applying such a weighing process,
most courts will likely prefer to recognize a right to the presence
of counsel. Indeed, there is general disdain for broadening the use
of exclusionary rules.82
Another alternative for the court would have been to recognize a right to full representation, with counsel participating in
the court's authority to stay civil proceedings until after the completion of a criminal trial
arising out of the same set of facts, see Note, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings,
67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1277 (1967); Note, Federal Courts-Discovery-Stay of Discovery in
Civil Court to Protect Proceedings in Concurrent Criminal Action-The Pattern of
Remedies, 66 MICH.
L. REV.738 (1968).
80. Brief for Appellants at 14-15.
81. The First Circuit suggested a similar solution in Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d
1280 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on rehearing, 510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir.), rev'd, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). The court deemed
use immunity to be "a rational accommodation between the imperatives of the privilege
against self-incrimination and the legitimate requirements of prison disciplinary procedures," and held that "[wlhere the possibility exists of . . . [a state] inmate being
penalized for the same criminal conduct in a disciplinary hearing and a criminal trial, he
should be entitled to 'use' immunity for statements he might make within the prison
disciplinary hearing." 487 F.2d at 1289-90.
In People v. Coleman, 13 Cal. 3d 867, 533 P.2d 1024, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 (1975), the
California Supreme Court fashioned an exclusionary rule for probation revocation hearings. The court held that whenever the hearing precedes disposition of criminal charges
arising out of the alleged violations of probation conditions, upon timely objection the
testimony of a probationer given at the hearing is inadmissible against him during the
subsequent criminal trial, except for impeachment purposes.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,443-60 (1976), for a lengthy discussion and list of commentators who discourage the practice of broadening the use of exclusionary rules.
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direct and cross-examination." There may be times when full
representation will be necessary under due process analysis, such
as when the university presents its own case through legal counsel?' However, the court's unwillingness to address the issue of
complete representation was justified. It was, in fact, the decision
of appellee's attorney to narrow the issue to whether the presence
of counsel was required.85Any attempt by the court to resolve the
issue of complete representation would have been unnecessary to
the court's holdingY

C . Evaluation of the Court's Holding

'

The question facing the court in the instant case was whether
or not to recognize the right of appellee to have his lawyer present
at the hearing. The balance does not tip as heavily toward appellee as the court concluded when the composition of the disciplinary board, the right to nonlegal counsel from within the university community, and the protection that appellee's lawyer could
provide without being present are all considered in the weighing
process." However, if these considerations are weighed against
the risk of expulsion, a serious deprivation underemphasized by
the court,88it becomes evident that appellee would face a dilemma a t the disciplinary hearing that is not faced in other types
83. See, e.g., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1,484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th
Cir. 1973); Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 466-67 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Marin v.
University of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613, 623 (D.P.R. 1974); Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202,
209 (W.D.N.C. 1972);French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333,1338 (E.D. La. 1969). But cf.
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651-52 (W.D. Mo. 1967) (defending student permitted to have counsel present with him a t the hearing to advise him, but
attorney could not conduct direct and cross-examination).
84. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 812 (2d Cir. 1967); French v.
Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (E.D. La. 1969). In French, the "prosecution" at the
college disciplinary hearing was conducted by a senior law school student who had been
chosen to prosecute student disciplinary hearings because of his familiarity with legal
proceedings. The court held that the defending student was entitled to full representation
of counsel a t the hearing because even though the law student was not an attorney his
abilities to conduct the prosecution were much superior to the student's ability to defend.
85. See note 58 supra. Perhaps counsel for appellee sensed that appellee's case might
be lost on the full representation issue. See note 92 infra.
86. Another issue that was not necessary for the court to discuss, but which presents
a perplexing question, is whether a student's constitutional right to have counsel present
at his disciplinary hearing requires the appointment of counsel when the student is indigent. For a discussion of this issue, see French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (E.D.
La. 1969). See also Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1291-92 (1st Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded, 418 U.S. 908 (1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on rehearing, 510 F.2d
534 (1st Cir.), rev'd, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), for the First Circuit's analysis of the issue of
retained versus appointed counsel within the prison disciplinary context.
87. See notes 70-75 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 92 infra. See also note 66 supra.
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of civil proceedings, even where the pendency of criminal
charges is a factor.
The grand jury witness, the suspect in an investigative proceeding, and even appellee in the criminal trial face one major
risk in testifying-the risk of self-incrimination. At the disciplinary hearing, appellee faces both the risk of self-incrimination
and the risk of expulsion. What he says at the hearing, and what
he refuses to say, will affect both his opportunity to remain in
college and his opportunity to safeguard his defense in the upcoming criminal trial. The presence of counsel can provide onthe-spot assistance as appellee is confronted with questions that
require him to choose between the risks of expulsion and selfincrimination. The necessity of choosing between these risks,
which may exist with every question asked at the hearing, provides a compelling reason for recognizing a right to counsel in the
instant case?

D. Implications of the Decision
Gabrilowitz will probably stand not merely for the proposition that a student may have a right to counsel at a college disciplinary hearing, but also for the proposition that, in order to
protect his privilege against self-incrimination, an accused may
- --

89. Periodic consultations with counsel outside the hearing room between questions,
which was suggested by the dissent, may result in an unnecessarily lengthy proceeding
and would likely be a greater infringement upon the university than the presence of
counsel in the hearing room. See Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280,1292 (1st Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 418 U S . 908 (1974), aff'd in part and reu'd in part on rehearing,
510 F.2d 534 (1st Cir.), reu'd, 425 U S . 308 (1976).
In recognizing a right to counsel on the basis of pending criminal charges, courts are
admittedly faced with an interesting problem. Arguably, as Judge Campbell pointed out
in his dissent, recognizing a right to counsel when a student faces pending criminal charges
is just a short step away from requiring counsel for most students facing possible expulsion
a t a disciplinary hearing.
Most conduct of a serious enough nature to merit disciplinary action will involve
a t least colorable misdemeanors, if not felonies, and a student very well might
contend that the fact that criminal charges may be brought, even if they are
not pending, requires the presence of counsel at his hearing.
582 F.2d a t 107 (Campbell, J., dissenting).
Indeed, there seems to be little justification for denying the right to counsel to one
who faces possible criminal charges when his interest in avoiding self-incrimination may
be as great as one who has already been charged. Also, if a right to counsel is recognized
for only a person previously charged, a state might be encouraged to postpone bringing
charges against an individual until after the civil proceeding, so that a right to counsel
would not attach.
Resolution of the problems outlined above are difficult in the abstract. However, in
the context of a specific case, these problems are merely additional factors to be considered in the application of the due process balancing test.
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have a due process right to counsel at a parallel civil proceeding.
The fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination is
generally interpreted today as protecting only compelled testimony. The Supreme Court has specifically stated that "the Fifth
Amendment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a
'genuine compulsion of testimony.' ""However, the court in the
instant case seems to have concluded that additional protection
is necessary to ensure that a potential self-incriminator makes
intelligent and informed choices regarding the exercise of his constitutional prerogatives. This protection, the court intimated, can
only be provided by the presence of legal counsel in the hearing
room." Thus Gabrilowitz promotes greater protection against the
danger that an accused might forfeit, by ignorance or pressure,
his privilege against self-incrimination.
The effect of Gabrilowitz on college disciplinary hearings
may be substantial. However, this case does not stand for the
position that a student has an automatic right to counsel at a
college disciplinary hearing? Rather, the case should be read as
an affirmance of the position that procedural due process, by its
very nature, is a flexible system for protecting the private interests of individual^.^^
90. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) (quoting Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974)).
91. 582 F.2d a t i05-06.
92. Both the district court and the First Circuit would likely have denied appellee a
right to counsel on the basis of the risk of expulsion alone. The district judge stated: "If
this controversy stopped a t the schoolhouse door, the court would be hesitant to enter in
it. . . . But, the consequences of this plaintiffs participation in what otherwise might be
strictly a University affair, reaches well beyond the University walls in terms of potential
effect upon the plaintiff." Gabrilowitz v. Newman, No. 77-686 (D.R.I. Dec. 15, 1977)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
Likewise, the First Circuit preferred not to intrude upon the university on the basis
of the risk of expulsion alone. The role of counsel spelled out by the court looks almost
exclusively toward the pending criminal action.
The limited role of counsel that we are considering . . . would not be very
intrusive. Counsel would be present only to safeguard appellee's rights a t the
criminal proceeding, not to affect the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. Counsel's principal functions would be to advise appellee whether he should answer
questions and what he should not say so as to safeguard appellee from selfincrimination; and to observe the proceeding firsthand so as to be better prepared to deal with attempts to introduce evidence from the hearing a t a later
criminal proceeding.
582 F.2d a t 106 (footnotes omitted).
93. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra. By openly utilizing the procedural
due process balancing test, the court made the basis for its decision apparent. When a
court does not utilize the balancing test in its opinion, analysis often stays unrevealed and
camouflaged in the robes of "following precedent." For example, several courts that have
not recognized a right to counsel a t college disciplinary hearings have relied upon the
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IV. CONCLUSION
The decision of whether a due process right to counsel exists
within the setting of a college disciplinary hearing, or any other
civil proceeding, must be made on a case-by-case basis in the
~
the court's discretion
exercise of sound d i ~ c r e t i o n ?However,
need not be open-ended. Procedural due process issues are best
resolved by discussing and distinguishing related cases, while
applying a balancing test to the peculiar facts of the case at hand.
In Gabrilowitz, the First Circuit utilized the due process balancing test to conclude that a student has the right to have counsel present at a university disciplinary hearing where the conduct
subject to the disciplinary hearing is also the object of a pending
criminal proceeding. It is questionable, however, whether the
court fully recognized the possible impact its decision could have
on the broader question of whether an accused in a criminal proceeding has the right to have his attorney present a t a parallel
civil proceeding. Had the court in the instant case been more
careful in its analysis and more thorough in its use of case authority, Gabrilowitz might have served as a further protection of the
rights of individuals facing threats to their fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. As it now stands, this aspect of
Gabrilowitz may not be recognized and utilized in succeeding
cases.

Rodney Jay Vessels
omission of that right in Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (.961), to justify their result. See note 16 and accompanying
text supra. However, the criteria for college disciplinary hearings outlined in Dixon should
not be rigidly adhered to as the only criteria by which a court under all circumstances
may determine whether a particular procedural safeguard is required. In Dixon, the court
properly recognized that due process rights are determined by weighing the conflicting
interests of the parties and by the circumstances surrounding the controversy. 294 F.2d
at 155.
94. "The due process right to counsel, usually applied on a case-by-case basis, extends a qualified right to counsel to persons not involved in criminal proceedings . . . . "
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 54 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Cf. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U S . 778, 788-91 (1973) (case-by-case approach for determining whether to
permit counsel in parole and probation revocation hearings).

